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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of papers in the recent past are concerned with the models of vertical 
product differentiation (that is differentiation by quality) under different market 
structures, heterogeneous preferences and income disparities. In this paper we try to find 
how a change in the distribution of income will affect the quality choice made by firms 
producing search goods under different market structures with two rather uncommon 
assumptions, namely, positively skewed income distribution and willingness to pay 
parameter value expressed as a function of income of individual. 
The inequality in the distribution of income is a common and noteworthy feature of 
developing and under developed economies. In recent years the good development 
strategy became synonymous with import liberalization and outward orientation (Jalan 
(1991)) and less government intervention. This idea is reflected in the Structural 
Adjustment Programme adopted by IMF in different third world countries in the early 
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nineties (Jalan (1991)). This particular policy requires a high export growth for the 
maintenance of balance of payments equilibrium. It has been shown elsewhere that 
among various factors that influence export of a developing country like India non-price 
factors seem to be dominant (Marjit and Raychaudhuri (1997)). The most significant 
non-price factor that determines the competitiveness of the export goods is the quality of 
products. Unless quality standards are maintained properly, goods cannot be sold in the 
market. In recent years the problem of improvement in product quality has become a 
matter of serious concern in different third world and less developed countries. Along 
with this, the policies adopted by third world countries to initiate economic liberalization 
are also affecting the distribution of income. Not only that, reduction of absolute poverty 
and relative income inequality are also a part of government policies of less developed 
counties. This paper tries to find the impact of a change in relative income inequality on 
the price and quality levels served by firms, in a situation where income is unequally 
distributed among the population. 
The effect of income disparities on a vertically differentiated industry was first 
analysed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). They considered the impact of income 
distribution parameters on a vertically differentiated duopoly model where firms are 
simultaneously determining their prices with exogenously given quality levels of their 
product. According to them at low average income level both firms have incentives to 
support a policy that raises average income. Beyond some level, such an increase is no 
longer profitable to low-quality producer as consumers will become rich enough to 
purchase the high quality good. Secondly considering standard deviation as a measure of 
income inequality the model shows that if income distribution becomes more egalitarian 
the low quality product will disappear from the market. This entire analysis is based on 
the assumption that income is following a uniform distribution. The assumption of 
uniform distribution is present in different papers by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), 
and Boom (1995). 
Given that our basic aim is to analyse the effect of different income inequality 
reduction measures on quality level served by the firms of under developed countries, 
we have combined the endogenous quality choice with non-uniform distribution of 
income. Assumption of non-uniform distribution of income helps as to address different 
types of changes in the relative income inequality that cannot be captured using the 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) model with uniform distribution of income with 
exogenous quality choice. For example, the uniform distribution cannot take account of 
the impact of any asymmetric improvement in the level of income in favour of any 
particular income group. 
The present paper has widened the scope of this type of analysis in the following 
manner: 
 
• Non-uniform distribution of income is used for the analysis; 
• The product quality choice has been made endogenous;   
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    (1977) to measure relative income inequality.   
• The willingness to pay parameter value for quality of a representative consumer is   
    defined as a function of his income level. 
 
In this analysis we use Mussa and Rosen (1978) type consumer preference structure. 
According to them consumers are heterogeneous. They have different willingness to pay 
for quality. Each consumer is indexed by a willingness to pay parameter value. A 
consumer with higher willingness to pay for quality will prefer a high quality product. In 
most of the papers it is assumed that the willingness to pay parameter is uniformly 
distributed (Choi and Shin (1992), Motta (1993), Wauthy (1996) Ecchia and Lambertini 
(1997)). In the analysis here, it is assumed that willingness to pay for quality of an 
individual is determined by her income level. An individual with high income has higher 
willingness to pay for quality and prefers high quality product. In this case inequality in 
the distribution of income is the reason for heterogeneity in consumer preferences. This 
type of interpretation of willingness to pay parameter is present in the analysis of Tirole 
(1988). There, this parameter is considered as marginal rate of substitution between 
income and quality, which is also equal to inverse of the marginal utility of income. A 
wealthy consumer has lower marginal utility of income and thus has higher willingness 
to pay for quality. Given that willingness to pay parameter is a function of income level 
of individual, the distribution followed by willingness to pay parameter is conditional 
upon the distribution of income. Any change in the distribution of income will change 
the distribution of willingness to pay parameter.   
The impact of income redistribution measures on quality is interlinked with structure 
of markets. For this reason we consider the quality choice of firms in both monopoly and 
duopoly models using the same set of parameters regarding consumers preference 
pattern.   
First we consider how changes in the distribution of income affects the quality 
choice made by an imperfectly discriminating monopolist supplying search goods. Here 
following Mussa and Rosen (1978) we assume that cost function of monopolist is 
convex in quality and linear in quantity. 
Secondly the model considers the effects of a change in income distribution 
parameters on a two-stage duopoly where firms simultaneously choose their quality 
levels at the first stage of the game and prices are determined simultaneously at the 
second stage of the game. It is assumed that the producers are supplying two different 
varieties of a search good with identical cost function that is convex in quality and linear 
in quantity. The model assumes that the market is endogenously covered. 
On the basis of above mentioned assumptions the model reveals some interesting 
results, which may seem counterintuitive. 
 
• If income inequality is reduced by making consumers equally worse off, a 
monopolist reduces his quality levels. However certain degree of inequality is 
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market. Under the same set of assumptions in a duopoly market high and low quality 
producers also reduce their quality levels. However if the degree of inequality is 
reduced below a certain critical level the low quality producer is driven out of the 
market. This last result is same as that obtained by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), 
but their model did not focus on the movement in the quality levels for the changes 
in the degree of income inequality. 
 
• Next the model considers an increase in the average income of the population that 
also reduces degree of income inequality by making consumers equally rich. In this 
case the monopolist will always improve high quality level. In the duopoly structure 
both firms will improve their quality levels. 
 
• Finally another type of redistribution of income is considered where position of low- 
income group is improved by making the distribution of income more concentrated. 
Due to this asymmetric change in the distribution of income degree of income 
inequality actually rises. Under this situation the monopolist for some parameter 
values first reduces quality levels but later improves quality levels of his product. In 
the duopoly model high quality producer will always improve his quality level and 
low quality producer will also improve his quality level provided he operates in the 
market. Thus in this situation even an increase in the degree of income inequality is 
driving low quality producer out of the market. This result may seem counter- 
intuitive. The asymmetric improvement in the distribution of income in favour of the 
low-income group causes low quality consumers to switch towards high quality 
product and low quality producer disappears from the market for drastic change in 
income inequality. This result is in contrast with the result obtained by Gabszewicz 
and Thisse (1979). According to their analysis as we have already mentioned a 
systematic reduction in income inequality will drive the low quality producer out of 
the market. But this result shows that even an increase in the relative income 
inequality is causing the low quality producer out of the market. Basically with the 
uniform distribution we cannot take account of all types of measures taken to remove 
relative income inequality. So our model has helped to make the entire analysis 
closer to reality due to the presence of non-uniform distribution of income.   
 
Rest of the paper is organised in the following way - in Section 2 the basic model is 
described. In Section 3 the nature of change in distribution of income is analysed. 
Section 4 shows how a change in the inequality coefficient of the income distribution 
will affect the quality choice of a monopolist. Section 5 gives the effect of income 
distribution change on the quality levels served by firms in a vertically differentiated 
duopoly. Section 6 gives the conclusion. 
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2.  THE  MODEL 
 
2.1.  The  Preference  Structure 
 
There is a continuum of consumers, whose types are identified by, θ which is 
distributed over the range given as  ].     ,   [ θ θ   The distribution function is given as  ) (θ H  
and density function is given as  ) ( ( ) θ θ H h ′ = .  θ   is the index of willingness to pay for 
quality of an individual consuming one unit of a search good. The utility function of 
type  θ   is defined as   
 
p q u − =θ   if the consumer purchases one unit of product with price p and quality q. 
   0                  o t h e r w i s e                                     ( 1 )  
 
Here it is assumed that willingness to pay for quality is a function of income of the 
individual. Let y be the income and it is distributed over the given range  ] , [ y y . The 
distribution function is    and density function is  ) (y F ) ( ) ( y F y f ′ = . 
We further assume that 
 
  0    , 0      ) ( < ′ ′ > ′ = θ θ θ θ y                                              ( 2 )  
 
with  ) (   and   ) ( y y θ θ θ θ = =  
 
Following Flam and Helpman (1987) the distribution function of θ  is defined as 
follows: 
 
  ] , [         ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ θ δ θ θ θ ∈ ∀ + − = G k H                                ( 3 )
1 
 
Then the density function of  θ   is defined as   
 
  ) ( ) (    and   ) ( ) (    where ], , [ for    ) ( ) ( θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ δ θ G g H h g k h ′ = ′ = ∈ ∀ + =         ( 4 )  
 
0 =   otherwise 
 
2.2.    The Income Distribution Function 
 
The distribution function of income is defined as 
 
1 For detailed explanation regarding the properties of density function see APPENDIX 1. TANMOYEE CHATTERJEE AND AJITAVA RAYCHAUDHURI  56
 
  )) ( ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( y G y y k y F θ δ θ θ + − =                                       ( 5 )  
 







The density function of income is defined as 
 
) ( ))] ( ( [ ) ( y y g k y f θ θ δ ′ + =                                             ( 6 )  
 
The income follows a positively skewed distribution.
2 
In this case for simplicity of analysis and to avoid fuzziness we will be assuming that 
 
) )( ( ) ( θ θ θ θ θ − − = G                                                 ( 7 )  
 
  ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ θ θ − + = ′ =G g                                            ( 8 )  
 
] , [   all for    0 2 ) ( ) ( θ θ θ θ < − = ′ = ′ ′ g G  
 




3.    INCOME DISTRIBUTION CHANGE AND RELATIVE INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
 
3.1.    Nature of Income Distribution Change 
 
In this paper we consider two different types of change in income distribution pattern.   
Firstly we consider a change in  δ  values which implies a redistribution of income 
keeping domain of income  ] , [ y y  fixed. 
Secondly we consider an improvement in absolute income levels of individuals by 
 
2 See APPENDIX 1 for proof. 
3   . ] , [ for 0 ) ( θ θ θ θ ∈ ∀ ≥ h .
2




> < ′ = G  
To get 0 ) ( ≥ θ h for allθ we try to show that 0 ) ( ≥ θ h . 
. or        0 ) ( ) 2 ( ) (
2 δ δ
δ
θ θ δ θ θ θ δ θ ≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ − = − − = − + + = k k
k
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changing the domain  ] , [ y y . A change in  ] , [ y y   will in turn affect  ]   , [ θ θ  and  .  k
In order to find out the effects of a change of above parameters on relative income 
inequality we will use the idea of relative concentration curve as developed by Kakwani 
(1977). 
 
3.2.    Effects of a Change in δ on Relative Income Inequality 
 
From (5) we have 
 







Thus in this case if the value of  δ  is increased, proportion of population below any 
income group will rise. This implies that an increase in  δ  puts a higher weight of the 
probability mass on poorer part of the distribution of the income and consumers become 
equally poor. 
Let us consider two different values of  δ , given as   and  1 δ 2 δ , with  .  2 1 δ δ >
We define 
 
) ( ] )) ( ( [ ) ( 1 y y g k y f θ θ δ ′ + =  
 
) ( ))] ( ( [ ) ( 2
* y y g k y f θ θ δ ′ + =  
 
Here   and    are density functions corresponding to   and   
respectively. 
) (y f ) (
* y f 1 δ 2 δ
Corresponding distribution functions are 
 
)) ( ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( 1 y G y y k y F θ δ θ θ + − =  
 
)) ( ( )] ( ) ( [ ) ( 2







dy y yf ) ( µ  and  ∫ =
y
y
dy y yf ) (
* * µ  
 
The first moment distribution functions are defined as 




dy y yf y F ) (
1
) ( 1 µ
 and  ∫ =
y
y









We draw the relative concentration curve of   vs  . This relative 
concentration curve will pass through (0,0) and (1,1). If it is concave (or convex) then 
  is greater (or less) than    for all levels of    and Lorenz curve of income 
distribution function   will lie wholly above (below) the Lorenz curve of income 
with distribution function  . 














Lemma 1 : Given the distribution function of income, a rise in δ leads to a decrease in 
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 [hence  proved] 







,    for all levels of income  . So for 
a rise in 
) ( ) (
*
1 1 y F y F > y
δ , Lorenz curve for redistributed income will lie wholly above the initial 
Lorenz curve. So gini coefficient of income inequality will fall. Thus a rise in δ  
actually decreases the income inequality. PRODUCT QUALITY, INCOME INEQUALITY AND MARKET STRUCTURE  59
 
) (y F ) ( 1 δ y F
) ( 2 δ y F
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y y
y level   income   below
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Note: With  , as  2 1 δ δ > δ   falls distribution function moves towards AB line, and proportion of 





3.3.    Effect of a Change in  ] , [ y y   on Relative Income Inequality 
 
In this structure a possible change in income distribution pattern can be introduced 
by change in the domain of income. From properties of distribution function we have 
 





=                                                    ( 9 )  
 
Any improvement in income level of individuals, which is affecting  y  and  y  will 
change  . Here  k )) ( ) ( ( y y θ θ −  gives that difference between willingness to pay for 
quality of highest income group and that of lowest income group. It is an index of the 
size of the market. The parameter    is inversely related to the size of the market.  kTANMOYEE CHATTERJEE AND AJITAVA RAYCHAUDHURI  60
 
) ) ( ) ( (
2 y d y y d y k dk θ θ ′ − ′ − =                                         ( 1 0 )  
 
If  0 > y d  and   then  0 = dy 0 < dk . When benefit of change in distribution of 
income is distributed among the population by widening the domain of income,   will 
fall. 
k
If  0 = y d  and   then  . If policy variables increase income of lowest 
income group so that income distribution is made more concentrated,   will  increase. 
0 > dy 0 > k d
k
 
From (5) we have   
 
0 )) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( (
2 2 < − + − − − ′ − − = y y k y d y y k y d y y y dF θ θ δ θ θ δ θ θ θ   (11) 
 
So for improvement in  y  and (or)  y , number of consumers below any income 
level will fall and overall population will become rich. 
Secondly we try to find how the average income level of the economy changes for 
improvements in  y  or  y  
 
∫ ′ − + + =
y
y
dy y y y y k y ) ( )) ( 2 ) ( ) ( ( ( θ θ θ θ δ µ  
 
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
2



















Thus an increase in  y   will improve the average income level of the economy. 
 


















 − ′ − = ∫  
 
In this case first part is always negative and second part is positive. We find that the 
effect of a redistribution in income through an increase in  y   is ambiguous in nature. 
Next we try to find the nature of change in relative income inequality. Let the initial 
values of parameters are  ) , , (
1 1 1 y y k  where 










) ( ))] ( 2 ) ( ) ( ( [ ) (
1 1 1 y y y y k y f θ θ θ θ δ ′ − + + =  
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)) ( ) ( ))( ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 y y y y y y k y F θ θ θ θ δ θ θ − − + − =  
 
Let the income levels are improved and new parameter values are  ) , , (
2 2 2 y y k  
 
) ( ))] ( 2 ) ( ) ( ( [ ) (
2 2 2
* y y y y k y f θ θ θ θ δ ′ − + + =  
 
)) ( ) ( ))( ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) (
2 2 2 2
* y y y y y y k y F θ θ θ θ δ θ θ − − + − =  
 
































































determines the direction of change in the 
of slope of relative concentration curve. 
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    ( A )  
 
 
where    is the initial value of    1 k k
 
Lemma 2 : A redistribution of income that entails an increase in only  y  will reduce 
relative income inequality and any redistribution with an increase in only  y  will 
increase income inequality. 
 
Proof : Obtained by putting  0 = y d  and  0 = y d  respectively in the expression (A) 
above. 
 
So following Lemma 2, if  y  changes alone, then   for all levels of  ) ( ) (
*
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income  . So for rise in  y y  with  y   fixed, Lorenz curve for redistributed income will 
lie wholly above the initial Lorenz curve. So gini coefficient of income inequality will 
fall. Thus a rise in  y  is actually reducing the income inequality. Basically an increase 
in  y  expands the domain of distribution of income. This allows upward income 
mobility of people belonging to all income groups below initial value of  y . Thus 
number of people belonging to all income groups below initial value of  y  will  fall  and 
the distribution becomes less skewed, or relative income inequality is reduced. 
h q
q
On the other hand, if  y
)
 changes alone, then the relative concentration curve is 
concave and   for all levels of income y. So for a rise in  ( ) (
*
1 1 y F y F > y   with  y  
fixed, Lorenz curve for redistributed income will lie wholly below the initial Lorenz 
curve. So gini coefficient of income inequality will rise. Thus a rise in  y  is actually 
increasing the income inequality. This result may seem counter intuitive. Suppose  y  is 
increased to  y′. An increase in  y  narrows the domain of distribution of individual 
income and this improves the absolute position of people belonging to the lower end of 
the distribution of income (that is people belonging to the range  < y y′) without 
affecting the position of higher income groups. Thus for this type of redistribution of 
income proportion of people in the lowest income level (that is in  y′) rises while 
number of people in the higher income groups remains the same (here we are rejecting 
the possibility of downward income mobility). So this makes distribution of income 
more skewed and relative income inequality rises even if the absolute poverty of lower 
income groups is reduced. 
 
 
4.    THE IMPACT OF CHANGE IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION   
ON MONOPOLY MARKET 
 
4.1.  The  Monopoly  Structure  
 
In this case we try to find the price and quality levels provided by an imperfectly 
discriminating monopolist producing two different varieties of a search good where cost 
function is linear in quantity and convex in quality. 
Let the cost function be defined as   where   is the quality level and  x q C
2 α = q x 
is the quantity level and  0 > α . We assume that monopolist is imperfectly segmenting 
his market. He serves two different quality levels of a search good. 
 
Let  : quality level of high quality product 
1: quality level of low quality product where    at all levels  1 q qh >PRODUCT QUALITY, INCOME INEQUALITY AND MARKET STRUCTURE  63
h p : price level of high quality product 
1 p : price level of low quality product 
h x : demand level of high quality product 
1 x : demand level of low quality product 
 
Let us consider a value of θ  such as   for which an individual is indifferent 











= θ                                                       ( 1 2 )  
 
Here  θ θ θ < <
*  
 
An individual with value of   will purchase high quality product. So 
. Now an individual
* θ θ ≥
) ( 1
* θ H xh − =
 will buy low quality product if  . Let us 
define a value   where 
0 1 1 ≥ − p q θ






= θ                                                           ( 1 3 )  
 
An individual with value   is not purchasing anything. Let us define an 
income level   where  . So individuals with income below    are facing a 
purchasing power constraint and are not consuming anything. Under this case demand 
for low quality product is given by  . Now equilibrium value of   
depends on the quality and price choice of the monopolist. We assume the monopolist is 
maximizing his profit to determine  ,  ,  ,  . 
1 θ θ <
) ( 1 y
1 x
h p
1 y 1 θ θ = 1 y
) ) (  
*
l H H θ θ (   − =
1 p h q 1 q
1 θ
The profit of the monopolist is defined as 
 
)) ( ) ( ]( [ )) ( 1 ]( [ 1
* 2
1 1
* 2 θ θ α θ α π H H q p H q p h h − − + − − =                      ( 1 4 )  
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∂
∂
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∂
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Using Equation (15) we get the following equation 
 
h q α θ 2







)) ( 1 ( )) ( ) ( ( 2 )) ( 1 ( 0 θ θ θ θ α θ θ
π
H H H q H
q
− = − + − ⇒ =
∂
∂
              ( 1 8 )  
 
Solving (15), (16), (17), (18) simultaneously we get the equilibrium value of  ,  , 
,  . Given these values prices   and    can be found from (12) and (13).
h q 1 q
h θ 1 θ h p 1 p
4 
 
4.2.    Effect of a Change in δ 
 
Given the first order conditions, we try to find how the quality levels of the product 
will change for a change in the income distribution parameter δ.
5 
In this case the computations show that as the value of δ increases from  0 = δ  to 
1 = δ , over the whole range the equilibrium values of  ,  ,  ,  ,   and  h q 1 q h p 1 p
* θ 1 θ  
are declining. In this case, as explained in Section 3, a rise in δ has two implications. 
Firstly relative income inequality is reduced and secondly, at the same time, number of 
people below any income level is increased. Due to this second factor the overall 
population will become poorer for a rise in δ. So monopolist charges lower prices and 
also serve lower quality levels. Thus as inequality is reduced through cutting income 
from above, thereby making population poorer, the willingness to pay for quality of the 
marginal consumers consuming both high and low quality products will fall due to fall 
in  ,  ,  ,  .  h p 1 p h q 1 q
However under this structure existence of low quality product in the market depends 
on certain criterion. When   and    both are falling, as   falls  below  1 θ
* θ 1 θ θ  we  have 
. This implies that there is full market coverage endogenously. However as δ 
increases, if    also moves below 
0 ) ( 1 = θ H
* θ θ , we have zero demand for low quality product in 
equilibrium. Thus low quality will not be sold in the market. 
 
4 In this framework, to solve the simultaneous equations we use the algorithm of “Newton’s method for 
solving the system of nonlinear equations”. 
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Our computations with  5 . 2 = θ ,  5 . 1 = θ  and  8 . 2 = θ ,  5 . 1 = θ  show that for .54 
≤ δ ≤ 1,   and   will fall below 
* θ 1 θ 5 . 1 = θ  and low quality product will disappear 
from the market. Basically as δ increases and the relative inequality is reduced, the 
monopolist will refrain from serving different qualities to different consumers. 
To maximize profit through discrimination certain degree of income inequality is 
required in the monopoly market. However with  5 . 2 = θ  and  8 . 1 = θ , the low quality 
product will disappear from the market for .27 ≤ δ ≤ 1. So for a given value of  θ , as  θ  
increases and market size becomes more concentrated, low quality product will 
disappear for a lower value of δ relative to earlier cases. So we observe that a 
redistribution of income, which reduces relative income inequality by making consumers 
poorer, will reduce the quality levels served by the monopolist. However if inequality is 
reduced below a certain level consumers will only purchase high quality good and low 
quality product will disappear from the market.
6 
Thus we conclude that a monopolist will be able to discriminate among the 
consumers (or will offer a separating menu) with heterogeneous preferences if there 
exists certain degree of inequality in the income distribution, under the assumption that 
willingness to pay for quality is a positive function of income of the consumers. Hence 
the model shows more than just a dependence of willingness to pay on income - the 
non-uniform distribution of income plays a more vital role here, which is not really 
highlighted in other models. Also high quality level falls as inequality is reduced. This 
leads to the proposition 1 below. 
 
Proposition 1 : There exists a set of values of  θ ,  θ , and k such that the monopolist will 
reduce the quality levels of the products, as inequality in the distribution of income is 
reduced as a consequence of a rise in δ. Secondly monopolist will serve two different 
quality levels in equilibrium (offering a separating menu) if and only if there exists 
certain degree of inequality in the market. 
 
4.3.    Effect of a Change in  y  
 
Now we consider the situation where a redistribution of income is introduced by 
increasing  y  while  y  is kept constant. In this case distribution of income is made 
wider. A rise in  y  will  increase θ  and  reduce  . We have already proved that a rise  k
 
6  The result of Mussa and Rosen (1978) shows that the discrimination is always profitable for the 
monopolist. However that result is based upon a given distribution of willingness to pay parameter value of 
the consumers, which is exogenously given. In this paper we have linked that distribution to distribution of 
personal income and relative inequality of income. Hence we show that certain degree of income inequality is 
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in  y  will reduce relative income inequality and make consumers richer. It is also 
improving average income of the economy. In this case computations show that 
direction of change in price levels and quality levels for a rise in  y  will depend upon 
values of  δ  also. 
1 p
θ
First we consider the model with  θ = 2.5  θ = 1.5.   
In the Figures 2, 3 and 4 values of quality levels, prices, and willingness to pay 
parameters corresponding to these parameter values of θ  and θ  are given as ( , 
), ( , ) and ( , ) respectively. Next we consider the case where 
h q
1 q h p
* θ 1 θ y  has 
increased so that    2.8   = θ  while θ  remains constant. In the figures, values of quality 
levels, prices, and willingness to pay parameters corresponding to these new parameter 
values of   and θ   are given as ( ,1 ), ( ,1 ) and ( ,1 ) respectively. 1 h q 1 q 1 h p 1 p 1
* θ 1 θ
7 
The computations show that as  y  has increased high quality level and price of 
high quality good has increased over the relevant range of  δ   values. Basically a rise in 
y  has reduced relative income inequality by making consumers richer. It is also 
increasing average income level of the economy. For this reason the monopolist is 
charging higher price and also serving better quality to consumers purchasing high 
quality product. The willingness to pay for the marginal consumer consuming high 
quality good will also increase. 
The monopolist is serving better quality level and charging a relatively higher price 
to even low quality consumer for a rise in  y  for lower values given as 0 ≤ δ ≤ .3. A 
lower δ value implies higher degree of income inequality. In this situation if  y  is 
increased, the overall population will become richer and inequality is also reduced. 
Under this situation the monopolist is serving better quality good at higher price to low 
quality consumers also. However as δ is increased (δ > .3) with corresponding rise in 
y (with  θ = 2.8,  θ = 1.5) income inequality is reduced further and population is also 
better off. In this case to sell the low quality product the monopolist changes its strategy 
and reduces the quality level of low quality good and charges lower price compared to 
the initial situation of  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.5. However for δ > .53 low quality product will 
not be sold. (See Figures 2, 3 and 4) In this case as inequality is reduced, all consumers 
will switch towards high quality product and low quality product disappears from the 
market. 
 
Proposition 2 : A reduction in relative income inequality by increasing y increases 
willingness to pay for quality of the consumers and this will induce the monopolist to 
improve the high quality level for all values of δ. Low quality level is improved for lower 
 
7 In this case with  θ = 2.8 and  θ = 1.5 the value of  = 0.769. From the properties of the distribution 
function we require that  . So values of the variables are calculated till 
k
δ ≥
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values of δ. For higher values of δ as inequality is reduced monopolist initially lowers low 
quality levels, but after a certain level it is not sold in the market at all. 
  
4.4.    Effect of a Change in  y  
 
A redistribution of income that entails an improvement of  y  will increase income 
inequality. A rise in  y  narrows the domain of distribution of income. This in turn 
improves the position of people belonging to the lower end of the distribution of income 
without affecting the position of people in higher side of the distribution of income. The 
effect of an increase in  y   on average income level is also ambiguous in sign. Under the 
circumstances initially we have θ = 2.5, θ = 1.5. For a rise in  y , parameter values 
become  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.8. In the figures given below the values of quality levels, prices 
and willingness to pay parameter values of marginal consumer corresponding to θ = 
2.5,  θ = 1.8 are given as ( ,2 q ), ( ,2 ) and ( ,2 ) respectively. (See 
Figures 2, 3 and 4)   
2 h q 1 2 h p 1 p 2
* θ 1 θ
In this case our computations show some interesting results. At δ = 0 the quality 
levels, prices and willingness to pay parameter values of the marginal consumer will be 
unchanged for an increase in  y . As δ is increased gradually, the monopolist will serve 
lower quality levels and charge lower prices relative to the initial level. Subsequently, 
willingness to pay for quality levels of the marginal consumer consuming high and low 
quality product will also fall. Basically at low values of δ, degree of income inequality is 
high. In this situation a redistribution of income will cause further deterioration in the 
income inequality pattern and due to this effect, the monopolist reduces quality levels 
even when some consumers are becoming richer. However for higher values of δ, when 
degree of inequality is becoming lower, a rise in  y  will lead to improvement in both 
quality levels because the second effect of a rising  y  (i.e., consumers are becoming 
richer) will dominate the increase in the degree of income inequality. At higher value of 
δ, the willingness to pay parameter values for quality of the marginal consumer will also 
increase leading to higher levels of quality. However low quality product will 
completely disappear from the market for .27 ≤ δ ≤ 1, even when  y  increases  because 
population has become rich enough to consume high quality level only. 
   
Proposition 3 : A rise in relative income inequality due to improvement in  y  will 
induce the monopolist to reduce quality levels for lower values of δ. At higher values of 
δ both quality levels will be improved. However for a specific range of δ, low quality is 
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5.    THE IMPACT OF REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME   
ON DUOPOLY MARKET 
 
5.1.  The  Duopoly  Structure 
 
In this section we analyse how the change in income distribution parameter will 
affect the quality choice made by duopolists producing two different varieties of a search 
good with identical cost functions, and endogenous market coverage. In the models of 
Shaked and Sutton (1983) and Cremer and Thisse (1999) there is a priori upper bound to 
the level of quality. In this model there is no such restriction on the quality level. It is 
only assumed that quality level assumes positive finite values. We assume that firm 1 is 
producing high quality variety of product with quality level  , price level   and 
demand for commodity  . Firm 2 is producing the low quality variety of the same 
product with quality level  , price level    and demand for commodity  . Here we 
assume that   at all levels. The cost function of each firm is identical, and it is 
linear in quantity and convex in quality.   
h q h p
h x
q1 1 p 1 x
1 q qh >
Given heterogeneous preference structure, there is a value of θ  given as   for 


















1 q q p p h h − + = θ                                                 ( 1 9 )  
 
Now consumers with value of  ] , [
* θ θ θ ∈   purchase the high quality product.   
So  Pr ob  .  = h x ) ( 1 ] [
* * θ θ θ H − = ≥
Let   be the willingness to pay for quality of the marginal consumer consuming 






= θ  or, 
 
1 1 1 q p θ =                                                          ( 2 0 )  
 
Consumers with willingness to pay parameter value below   will not purchase 
anything. In this case size of market is endogenously determined. Thus, consumers with 
value of    will purchase low quality product. So demand faced by low quality 
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= 1 x Pr ob  =  .  ] [
*
1 θ θ θ < < ) ( ) ( 1
* θ θ H H −
 
Here we consider a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game firms are 
simultaneously choosing their quality levels. In the second stage of the game firms, 
given the quality chosen in the first stage of the game, simultaneously determine price 
levels. The profits are determined as 
 
h h h h x q p ] [




1 1 1 ] [ x q p α π − =                                                    ( 2 2 )  
 
The game is solved by backward induction method. Initially profits are maximized 
with respect to prices given quality levels, and optimal prices are found as functions of 
quality levels. In this case we try to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, so in the 
second step profits are maximized simultaneously with respect to quality levels, given 
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Using (19) and (20) we have 
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Using (20) we have   
 
0 )) )( ( ) ( )( ( ) ))( ( ) ( ( 1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1
* = − + − − − − q q h q h q q q H H h h θ θ α θ θ θ             ( 2 6 )  
 
Solving (23) and (25), Nash equilibrium prices are found as functions of quality 
levels. For simplicity of analysis we replace expression for prices and get (24) and (26). 
Differentiating totally (24) and (26) with respect to   will give  h q
h dq
d
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Given (23) and (25), Nash equilibrium quality levels can be obtained by 
simultaneously solving (29) and (30) 
Next we try to find how quality levels served by firms will change for change in 
different income distribution parameters.
8 
 
5.2.    Effects of a Change in δ 
 
Computations show that for different values of  θ and  θ  a  rise  in  δ, which leads to 
a fall in relative income inequality, will induce both firms to reduce quality levels along 
with the price levels. Willingness to pay for quality of marginal consumer consuming 
both low and high quality product will also fall for a rise in δ. Basically a rise in δ is 
reducing relative income inequality but number of people below any income level 
increases. This implies that overall population is becoming poorer for this type of 
redistribution of income. For this reason willingness to pay for quality for marginal 
consumer consuming the high and low quality products will decline with a rise in δ, so 
that both firms will reduce the price levels and supply poor quality goods to the market. 
 
8 Computations show that second order conditions of the duopoly case are always satisfied for given 
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Proposition 4 : A redistribution of income that makes overall population poorer by 
improving the relative income inequality through an increase in δ will cause both firms 
to reduce quality levels in a duopoly market under the assumption of endogenous market 
coverage.  
 
5.3.    Effect of Change in  y  
 
As we have already mentioned an increase in  y   reduces relative income inequality 
by making overall population richer and it also increases average income level of the 
economy. A rise in  y  that increases θ  will induce both firms to serve better quality 
levels at higher prices. Initially we have considered the case with  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.5 and 
next we have considered the case with  θ = 2.8,  θ = 1.5 (i.e., parameter values are the 
same as in the monopoly case). With an increase in  θ , firms are charging higher prices 
and serving better quality goods as overall population has become richer. In this case a 
reduction in income inequality has caused an increase in the willingness to pay for 
quality of the marginal consumer consuming both high and low quality goods. 
  
5.4.    Effects of an Increase in  y  
 
An increase in  y  implies a corresponding increase in θ . In this case income 
inequality increases and the consumers in the lower end of the distribution of income 
become richer. Because of this second effect both firms will improve the quality and 
charge higher prices relative to the initial level and willingness to pay for quality of the 
marginal consumer will improve. However our computations with θ = 2.5, θ = 1.8 
show an interesting result. In this case both qualities will be available in the market for 
0 = δ . For  0 > δ   high quality producer will drive low quality product out of the market 
for  θ = 1.8. A rise in  θ   is increasing the degree of competition by reducing the size of 
the market. Hence low quality product is driven out of the market. It also induces the 
lower income group to switch towards high quality product due to an increase in their 
willingness to pay for quality. 
 
Proposition 5 : In a duopoly structure a rise in  y  or  y  will induce both firms to 
improve quality levels. 
 
5.5.    Comparison with Monopoly Case  
 
A comparison of results under two different market structures but identical 
parameter values reveals certain interesting facts. 
Firstly in case of monopoly certain degree of income inequality is required for the TANMOYEE CHATTERJEE AND AJITAVA RAYCHAUDHURI  78
existence of both high and low quality goods in the market. Our computations show that 
with  θ = 2.5, θ = 1.5 and θ = 2.8, θ = 1.5 for .54 ≤ δ ≤ 1,   and   will fall 
below 
* θ 1 θ
θ = 1.5 and low quality product will disappear from the market. So both goods 
are sold for 0 ≤ δ < .54. With  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.8, the low quality product will disappear 
from the market for .27 ≤ δ ≤ 1.   
However in case of duopoly the situation is totally different. With  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.5 
the low quality producer will face zero demand for his product for δ ≥ .73. So both 
qualities are sold even with lower degree of income inequality compared to monopoly 
case. In this case competition between the firms allows the low quality product to exist 
in the market. Under this situation for same values of δ, monopolist is serving lower 
quality levels compared to the duopoly market. Thus monopolist is under providing 
quality compared to the duopolists. 
In case of monopoly, quality levels are falling more rapidly with respect to δ 
compared to the duopoly case. This is possible because in case of duopoly competition 
between firms acts as a check on the falling quality levels and the monopolist thus 
extracts greater amount of consumers’ surplus compared to duopolists. 
Secondly our computation with the parameter values of θ = 2.8, θ = 1.5 gives a 
different result. In this case in a duopoly situation low quality producer will leave the 
market for δ > .29. This is because here a reduction in the relative income inequality and 
increase in the average income level are making consumers richer. Due to this effect 
consumers prefer to purchase high quality product. So low quality producer cannot 
compete with the high quality one and leaves the market for a lower value of δ 
compared to the monopoly case. 
However our computation with  θ = 2.5,  θ = 1.8 shows that both qualities will be 
sold only for δ = 0 in a duopoly market. A rise in  θ   reduces the size of the market and 
increases the degree of competition between firms. Because of this effect low quality 
will be driven out of the market. In case of monopoly, in the same situation, both 
qualities will be sold for  27 . 0 < ≤δ . In a monopoly situation profit maximization 
policy of the monopolist will determine whether a single quality level or more than one 
quality levels will be sold in the market. In case of duopoly competition between the 
firms determines whether a single producer or both high and low quality producer will 
operate in the market for different values of θ  and  θ  when market is not 
exogenously covered. In general given the same set of parameter values, in a monopoly 
market both quality levels can be sold while in a duopoly market, low quality may 
disappear from the market at a much higher relative income inequality compared to the 
monopoly market.   
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6.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
In this paper, in the backdrop of skewed income distribution in a typical developing 
country, we have tried to find how a change in the income distribution parameter will 
affect product qualities served by firms under different market structures. First we have 
considered a monopoly case and secondly we analyse the case of a duopoly where 
market is endogenously covered. We have considered different types of changes in the 
distribution of income.   
We find that when consumers are made poorer (thus reducing income inequality), a 
monopolist reduces quality levels of his products. Under the same set of assumptions, in 
a duopoly market, high and low quality producers are also reducing their quality levels. 
Given that index of willingness to pay is a function of income of consumers, a reduction 
in inequality of income where consumers are equally worse off reduces willingness to 
pay for quality of the consumers and producers serve lower quality levels in both types 
of markets. It is also shown that certain degree of inequality is always required for the 
existence of both high and low quality goods in the monopoly market.   
Secondly we have considered another type of change in the distribution of income. 
In this case distribution of income is made wider and average income level is improved 
along with a reduction in the degree of relative income inequality. In this case a 
monopolist always improves high quality level as improvement in average income level 
and reduction in the degree of relative income inequality increase willingness to pay for 
quality. However, for some parameter values the monopolist reduces low quality level. 
But this type of redistribution of income will induce both firms to improve quality levels 
in a duopoly market as overall population becomes richer. 
Thirdly we have considered another types of redistribution of income where 
distribution is made more concentrated and low-end consumers become richer, although 
the degree of income inequality increases. In this case for some values, the monopolist 
first reduces quality levels but later improves quality of its products. However under 
similar situations, high quality producing duopoly firm always improves quality level. 
Low quality producer also improves quality level simultaneously provided he operates in 
the market. Basically for this type of asymmetric change in the distribution of income in 
favour of low income group, consumers switch towards high quality level and low 
quality producer will disappear from the market for drastic change in income inequality.   
Thus, the paper highlights the asymmetric response of producers under alternative 
market structures under similar set of values for income distribution and willingness to 
pay parameters. The key difference of behaviour in the two markets basically is a result 
of the degree of competition in the markets. The more competitive the market structure 
is the less is the impact of inequality of income distribution on the quality spectrum of 
goods. Also, worsening income inequality does not necessarily guarantee higher quality 
levels if it does not make consumers richer, there by increasing willingness to pay for 
quality of the marginal consumers. TANMOYEE CHATTERJEE AND AJITAVA RAYCHAUDHURI  80
APPENDIX 1 
 
Following Flam and Helpman (1987) the distribution function of θ  is defined as 
follows: 
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Then the density function of  θ   is defined as   
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For different values of δ,θ will follow different distribution functions. 
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For 0 = δ , 0 ) ( = ′ θ h , and  θ   follows a uniform distribution. 
Given the distribution of  θ , underlying density function of income is defined as 
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Thus density function of income is always negatively sloped. So income follows a 
positively skewed distribution. PRODUCT QUALITY, INCOME INEQUALITY AND MARKET STRUCTURE  81
APPENDIX 2 
 
The density functions of income are defined as 
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Our computation shows that the second derivatives are negative at the relevant range 
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Note: In this case the  * θ  and  l θ correspond to  θ = 2.5 and  θ = 1.5 and  1 * θ  and  1 l θ  correspond to θ = 2.8 and  θ = 1.5 




Figure 2.    This Figure Shows the Relationship between Willingness to Pay Parameter Values   



























Note: In this case the   and   correspond to  qh ql θ = 2.5 and  θ = 1.5 and   and   correspond to  1 qh 1 ql θ = 2.8 and  θ = 1.5 
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Figure 5.    This Figure Shows the Relationship between Willingness to Pay Parameter Values   













Note: In this case the   and    correspond to  qh ql θ = 2.5 and  θ = 1.5 and   and   correspond to  1 qh 1 ql θ = 2.8 and  θ = 1.5 




















Note: In this case the   and   correspond to  ph pl θ = 2.5 and  θ = 1.5 and   and   correspond to  1 ph l1 p θ = 2.8 and  θ = 1.5 




Figure 7.    This Figure Shows the Relationship between Price Levels and  δ   Under Duopoly Case 